23 July 2025, Geneva

Situation Overview

China is a strategic supplier of key components, engines, electronics, navigation systems, and assembly equipment, that sustain Russia’s kamikaze drone offensives in Ukraine.  Notably, the Chinese-made HW‑T8‑80F pick‑and‑place machine (from Huawei Silkroad/HWGC) is reportedly in use at Russia’s drone assembly facilities, enabling efficient PCB production.  These revelations expose critical export-control gaps and spotlight China's pivotal role in enabling Moscow's long-range drone capability.

Key Findings

1. Chinese Engines & Electronics

• Garpiya-A1 loitering munitions (aka Geran-2) utilize Chinese-sourced Limbach L-550 E engines and electronics—confirmed by Reuters and EU intelligence 

• European & Ukrainian intel indicate that approximately 60-90% of electronic components in these drones are Chinese-manufactured
  
  

2. HW‑T8‑80F SMT Equipment

• Social media evidence (notably an X post by @zerkzal, imagery included in this FPB) shows Russian technicians at Alabuga drone plants using HW‑T8‑80F pick‑and‑place machines for PCB assembly 

• The machine’s specs, high-speed SMT capacity (10,000-12,000 CPH, ≤0.05 mm accuracy), match production needs for drone electronics
  
  

3. Drone Production in Alabuga / Yelabuga

• The Alabuga SEZ in Tatarstan hosts large-scale production lines for Shahed/Geran drones, staffed with both local students and recruited African labor 

• U.S. sanctions have been imposed on Chinese firms, such as Xiamen Limbach, for supplying drone engines, demonstrating official recognition of Chinese complicity.
  
  

Strategic Implications

• Sanctions Evasion: Dual-use Chinese exports (SMT gear, electronics) bypass Western restrictions, fueling Russia’s drone production.

• Capability Boost: Such technologies enhance Russia’s ability to sustain high-frequency strikes, pressuring Ukrainian air defenses.

• Global Tech Partnership: The Sino-Russian tech alliance illustrates a broader alignment across multiple “revisionist” powers: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea

Policy and Enforcement Recommendations 

1. Export-Control Update:

   • Expand multilateral controls to encompass advanced SMT / PCB equipment (e.g., HW‑T8‑80F-class machines).

2. Secondary Sanctions:

   • Target Chinese OEMs and intermediary firms facilitating sales to Russian drone hubs.

3. Forensic Tracking:

   • Include SMT serial numbers and manufacturing IDs in post-attack debris-to-leakage databases.

4. Enhanced OSINT Monitoring:

   • Track shipping data, auction listings, and imagery of RTV workflows in Alabuga / Yelabuga.

Flashpoints to Monitor

• New exports of SMT gear from China to Russia or third-party brokers.

• OSINT/photo evidence from Ukrainian drone wreckage, especially PCB serials.

• Updates on U.S./EU sanctions targeting specific Chinese companies.

• Footage from within Alabuga or Izhevsk factories revealing workflows.
  
  

Conclusion

Russia's kamikaze drone campaigns are increasingly relying on Chinese dual-use technologies, ranging from propulsion to electronics and board assembly. The HW-T8-80F pick-and-place machine is emerging as a linchpin in assembly, highlighting the critical role such machinery plays and the urgent need to close export-control loopholes.