6 August 2025, Geneva
As Moldova’s general elections approach, the country is under sustained cognitive and digital assault from Kremlin-linked actors. Disinformation campaigns, social media manipulation, and synthetic scandals are being deployed to fracture public trust and tilt the electoral playing field. This playbook mirrors previous Russian operations in Ukraine, Georgia, and the Balkans.
Moscow’s objective appears clear: erode Moldova’s pro-European trajectory, delegitimize reformist voices, and reinvigorate pro-Russian factions through manufactured instability.
36% of Moldovans report trusting Russian media sources more than domestic outlets (per recent IRI polling, June 2025).
Since May 2025, thousands of new Moldova-based Telegram channels have been created, many of which are linked to Russian botnets.
Over 150 fake news items targeting pro-European politicians were identified by Watchdog.md.
42% of election-related Facebook engagement in Moldova traced to non-authentic accounts or coordinated behavior.
€5 million+ in dark money linked to Kremlin-aligned business entities suspected of funding pro-Russian political groups.
Gagauzia & Transnistria regions show the highest volume of cognitive targeting and engagement with Russian-origin disinfo content.
Narrative Saturation: Telegram channels, Facebook pages, and local influencers are amplifying messages that paint Moldova’s government as corrupt, Western-controlled, and incompetent.
Synthetic Scandal Cycles: Fabricated leaks and forged documents accusing officials of bribery or collusion with “NATO spies” are proliferating—often seeded in Russian-language channels before spreading into Romanian outlets.
Information Laundering: Pro-Russian Moldovan media, some owned or influenced by Russian-aligned oligarchs, repackage disinformation with a veneer of local journalism.
Microtargeted Chaos: AI-assisted meme warfare and short-form videos stoke ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic tensions—particularly in Gagauzia and Transnistria.
Surge in newly created Moldovan social media accounts with profile bios in Russian.
Increased bot activity tagging opposition figures with pro-Kremlin hashtags.
Sharp uptick in “citizen journalist” videos seeded from Russian border regions.
Emergence of Romanian-language fake think tanks amplifying Moscow's talking points.
Moldova is a frontline state for both EU enlargement and Russian rollback strategy.
A successful cognitive destabilization campaign here would signal vulnerability across Europe’s eastern flank, particularly in Georgia, Serbia, and North Macedonia.
Western disengagement could lead to Moldova’s democratic backsliding or neutralization, without the need for Russian troops to cross the border.
Support Resilience Infrastructure: Fund and expand local fact-checking, digital literacy, and media monitoring initiatives.
Deploy Narrative Inoculation (pre-bunking): Proactively counter Kremlin narratives with trusted local voices and preemptive messaging.
Technical Attribution: Track and publicize the origins of synthetic scandals and bot networks.
Signal Western Commitment: Elevate Moldova diplomatically with joint EU/NATO statements on election security and hybrid threats.
Moscow is escalating its disinformation playbook in Moldova, combining synthetic scandals, influencer capture, and AI-generated propaganda ahead of the 2025 elections.
The goal isn’t just electoral interference, it’s institutional delegitimization. Russia is attempting to fracture trust in democracy itself, rendering any post-election outcome suspect.
Cognitive warfare is concentrating on Moldova’s fracture points, including ethnic identity, regional grievances, and economic hardship, particularly in Gagauzia and Transnistria.
Without preemptive Western engagement, Moldova could become a strategic loss, undermining broader democratic consolidation efforts across Eastern Europe.
This is a test case for defending democratic sovereignty in the cognitive domain; a failure here will echo from Tbilisi to Tallinn.
With upcoming national elections, Moldova will remain a high-risk target for hybrid manipulation. The current Kremlin playbook is not just about shifting electoral outcomes, but delegitimizing democracy itself.
Prepared by:
ISRS Strategic Advisory & Risk Analysis Unit
Geneva, Switzerland
About ISRS
The Institute for Strategic Risk and Security (ISRS) is an independent, non-profit NGO focusing on global risk and security.
Copyright (c) 2025, Institute for Strategic Risk and Security