5 September 2025, Geneva

Situation Overview

On August 31, 2025, the aircraft carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen experienced GPS jamming during its final approach to Plovdiv, Bulgaria. The disruption forced pilots to rely on ground-based navigation systems and backup maps. Officials from both the EU and Bulgaria suspect Russian interference, adding to a growing pattern of hybrid electronic warfare across NATO’s eastern frontier.

Key Data Points

• Target: Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission

• Location: Final approach to Plovdiv Airport, Bulgaria

• Date of Incident: 31 August 2025

• Nature of Attack: Suspected deliberate GNSS (GPS) jamming

• Source of Attribution: Bulgarian government and European Commission officials

• Outcome: Safe landing via alternate navigation systems

• Strategic Context: Von der Leyen was on an eastern EU tour to reinforce solidarity and strategic alignment with Ukraine and the Balkans
  
  

Technical Overview: What Is GPS Jamming?

GPS jamming refers to the deliberate transmission of radio frequency (RF) signals that interfere with the reception of satellite navigation data. The affected aircraft lost accurate GNSS signals and had to revert to Instrument Landing Systems (ILS) and traditional navigation aids.

Known Russian Capabilities:

Russia maintains an arsenal of mobile and fixed jamming systems such as the R-330Zh “Zhitel” and Tirada-2, capable of jamming GNSS signals over broad areas. These systems are routinely deployed near border zones, particularly during periods of geopolitical tension or NATO exercises.

Strategic Implications

1. Hybrid Warfare in the Air

This incident adds to a widening campaign of electromagnetic disruption attributed to Russian forces, which includes:

• GNSS spoofing/jamming in the Baltic and Black Sea regions

• Radar interference targeting civil aviation and military patrols

• Increased EW “gray zone” activity during high-profile diplomatic or NATO movements

2. Civilian Safety at Risk

Civilian aircraft depend heavily on GNSS during approach and landing phases, particularly at regional airports with limited redundancy. The fact that von der Leyen’s aircraft had to rely on paper charts underscores the vulnerability of critical transport infrastructure to low-cost electronic disruption.

3. Strategic Messaging from Moscow

Targeting the Commission President during a pro-Ukraine solidarity tour sends a clear political message, one that is escalatory, symbolic, and deniable. The interference was not kinetic, but it undermined a core tenet of international aviation safety: freedom of transit for heads of state.

Risk Assessment

Aviation Safety

Ground-based backups worked, but a vulnerability has been exposed
Risk Level: Medium

Geopolitical Tension

Potential escalation in EU-Russia hybrid confrontation
Risk Level: High

Public Confidence

Perceptions of weakness or vulnerability may be amplified
Risk Level: Medium

Electronic Warfare

Incident is part of a documented regional trend
Risk Level: High

Indicators to Watch

• Repeat interference during NATO, EU, or high-level visits in Eastern Europe

• EU aviation alerts or spectrum monitoring initiatives are ramping up

• Russian narrative management, including denial or misattribution

• Increased LEO satellite proposals for GPS backup or jamming detection

• Online amplification of criticism about the EU’s defensive posture and delay in response

Synthetic Asymmetry in Action

This is a textbook case of synthetic asymmetry, where cheap, deniable interference forces high-cost, high-stakes consequences on an adversary:

Tactical Outcome: Temporary disruption of navigation

Cognitive Impact: Demonstrates EU vulnerability during symbolic missions

Economic Cost: Increased urgency for anti-jamming tech, spectrum monitoring, and defense budgets

Infrastructure Signaling: Undermines trust in “invisible” infrastructure (space, signals, sovereignty)

ISRS Recommendations

For NATO & EU Policymakers:

• Accelerate deployment of RF spectrum monitoring stations at vulnerable airfields

• Fast-track LEO satellite constellations designed to detect GNSS jamming/spoofing

• Strengthen joint NATO-EU EW attribution protocols for below-threshold interference

For Civil Aviation Authorities:

• Require GNSS contingency training for flight crews operating near known hotspots

• Issue real-time NOTAMs for regions with suspected jamming events

• Encourage airlines to audit nav procedures and backup systems on high-risk routes

For Strategic Communicators:

• Frame jamming as an attack on civil freedom of movement, not just a technical glitch

• Deploy resilience narratives that highlight successful fallback procedures and the continuity of leadership mobility

• Monitor and counter info ops blaming the EU for escalation or “paranoia”

Conclusion

The jamming of von der Leyen’s aircraft is not an isolated event; it’s a signal in every sense. It challenges freedom of movement, undermines confidence in digital infrastructure, and demonstrates how non-kinetic tools can serve strategic aims without crossing into overt conflict. Europe must modernize its spatial defense posture and invest in narrative resilience alongside technical hardening.