By Igor Khrestin and Dave Venable
Senior Policy Advisor, George W. Bush Institute | Chairman, Institute for Strategic Risk and Security
The February 2022 Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine began not with tanks, but with code. Hours before Russian armor crossed the border, cyberattacks swept Ukrainian government networks, financial systems, and communications infrastructure. The physical and digital assaults were a single concept, executed simultaneously across domains.
Most analysts filed this under “hybrid warfare” and moved on. What happened in Ukraine that morning was more consequential: a demonstration that the convergence of cyber operations, precision kinetics, synthetic media, and AI-enabled targeting had compressed the time between strategic decision and strategic effect to near zero. The warning-and-response model of deter, detect, assess, decide, respond, had run out of time.
This compression belongs to no single actor. It is the defining strategic condition of our era, and one that the Institute for Strategic Risk and Security (ISRS), a Geneva-based security nongovernmental organization, has been tracking under the framework of synthetic asymmetry: technological convergence that produces a new category of strategic power, one accessible to mid-tier states and nonstate actors, that rewrites who can project power, how fast, and at what cost.
Applied to CRINK, the emerging alignment of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, Synthetic Asymmetry reveals something that standard threat assessments miss. The strategic danger these four states pose does not require formal alliance structures. It materializes regardless of whether they hold summits, sign treaties, or coordinate operations.
Prior analysis of CRINK has rightly focused on what these states share: repressive governance and hostility to the liberal international order, reinforced by deepening bilateral ties. That analysis holds. But it leaves a question unanswered. How does a grouping with no joint command, no formal secretariat, and often competing national interests generate coherent, sustained pressure against democratic institutions worldwide?
The answer lies in synthetic asymmetry. A Yemeni militia, the Houthis, are the clearest illustration. They sustained a campaign against global maritime trade using Iranian-supplied precision drones and antiship ballistic missiles. Iran transferred modular, convergent capabilities to a Houthi proxy, and that proxy achieved effects against the global trading system that no Yemeni military could have generated independently. The acquisition threshold for this class of power has dropped to the point where a substate actor can hold a major shipping lane at risk.
North Korea makes the same argument from a different position. North Korea fields no meaningful conventional power projection. Through nuclear deterrence combined with cyber operations that have generated hundreds of millions of dollars to fund weapons development, improving missile accuracy, and satellite reconnaissance, it has achieved deterrence against the United States. Synthetic Asymmetry lets an actor skip entire tiers of the traditional power hierarchy. The goal is not a military that matches America’s. It is a convergent toolkit that makes conventional superiority irrelevant in the domains that matter.
China sits at the top of this logic. Civil-military fusion eliminates the institutional lag that slows Western capability development, producing simultaneous integration across AI, cyber, synthetic media, precision systems, and biotechnology. Russia, operating under severe resource constraints, has proven that cyber-kinetic integration works as an operational concept. Each CRINK actor independently reaches for the same class of tools, shaped by its own strategic requirements.
The result looks like a coordinated campaign against the liberal international order. It does not require one. The coherence is emergent. Each actor, working its own interests with its own toolkit, generates systemic pressure that democracies must answer collectively. There is no headquarters to strike, no alliance to split, no coordination channel to cut. Complexity theorists recognize this as an emergent property of complex adaptive systems, the kind of order that arises without a coordinator and, crucially, cannot be dismantled by removing one.
That distinction changes what an effective response looks like. The standard prescription – reassure allies, back dissidents, maintain forward presence, counter disinformation – addresses CRINK as an ideological coalition. Those measures remain necessary. The normative architecture that has defined the defense of democratic institutions against authoritarian interference - support for civil society actors, alliances that have kept major-power conflict at bay since 1945 - retains its value.
The more neglected intervention is upstream: disrupting the convergence conditions that put Synthetic Asymmetry within reach of any actor willing to exploit them. AI governance with real enforcement teeth. Export controls that hold under commercial pressure. Dual-use biotechnology norms written before the next crisis, not during it. Synthetic media detection infrastructure given the same priority as missile defense. The race is not between our weapons and theirs. It is between our ability to govern these technologies and their ability to weaponize them.
President John F. Kennedy told the world in his inaugural address that America would “pay any price, bear any burden” in the defense of liberty. In 1961, that meant troops and money. In 2026, it also means the unglamorous, technical, often invisible work of setting rules for technologies that are rewriting the conditions of strategic competition, before CRINK sets them instead.
This analysis was developed in collaboration between the George W. Bush Institute and the Institute for Strategic Risk and Security (ISRS). The two institutions are working to examine how emerging technology convergence is reshaping strategic competition between democratic nations and authoritarian state actors.
Igor Khrestin is Senior Advisor for Global Policy at the George W. Bush Institute, where he focuses on CRINK states, authoritarianism, and transatlantic security.
Dr. Dave Venable is Chairman and President of the Institute for Strategic Risk and Security (ISRS) and a former U.S. intelligence officer. ISRS is a Geneva-based NGO focused on strategic risk, cybersecurity, and emerging technology threats.
ISSN 3043-0941 · Published by the Institute for Strategic Risk and Security, Geneva
This article opens the conversation, the panel on June 4th continues it. Four practitioners with direct experience across intelligence, infrastructure security, national security law, and authoritarian statecraft will examine what Synthetic Asymmetry means for democratic strategy, what an effective response actually requires, and how policymakers should be thinking about the convergence conditions CRINK is actively exploiting.
Date: 4 June 2026
Time: 2:00 PM ET / 8:00 PM CET
Location: Virtual
Access: Registration required (Seats are limited)
Igor Khrestin
Senior Advisor for Global Policy, George W. Bush Institute; Visiting Fellow at the National Security Institute at George Mason University
Brigham A. McCown
Chair & CEO, Alliance for Innovation and Infrastructure; ISRS Board Member
Tara Caroselli McFeely
Chief Operating Officer, National Security Institute at George Mason University
Dave Venable
Chairman, ISRS; former U.S. intelligence officer
Wm. David Hamilton
Executive Director, UNT National Security & Economic Strategy Center
About ISRS
The Institute for Strategic Risk and Security (ISRS) is an independent, non-profit NGO focusing on global risk and security.
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