21 October 2025, Geneva
Ukraine’s FP-5 “Flamingo” cruise missile represents a breakthrough in affordable, high-impact weaponry, developed amid the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict. With a range exceeding 3,000 km, a 1,150 kg warhead, and a unit cost of approximately $500,000, which is roughly one-fourth the price of the U.S. Tomahawk missile (over $2 million), the Flamingo exemplifies “affordable mass” design principles. Its simpler construction, utilizing repurposed components like refurbished Soviet-era engines and bombs, enables rapid production scaling, currently at 2–3 units per day with targets of 200 per month. While less precise and stealthy than Western counterparts, its extended range and heavier payload allow for deep strikes against strategic targets, such as Russian energy infrastructure and military facilities. This innovation underscores a shift toward cost-effective, volume-based armament strategies, offering valuable lessons for U.S. defense policy in an era of protracted conflicts and resource constraints.
“Ukraine’s Flamingo missile proves affordable, scalable weapons win wars. NATO countries must embrace this bold, cost-cutting approach to outpace adversaries.”
— Brigham McCown, ISRS Board Member
The FP-5 Flamingo, developed by the Ukrainian defense startup Fire Point, was first revealed on August 17, 2025, during a test launch. Founded by entrepreneurs from non-military backgrounds, Fire Point began work on the missile following Russia’s 2022 invasion, leveraging local ingenuity and international partnerships, including ties to the Milanion Group. Serial production commenced in mid-2025, with battlefield trials completed successfully. By September 2025, output reached 50 units per month, aiming for 210 monthly by October and seven per day by year-end. The missile has seen combat use, including strikes on Russian targets in Crimea and mainland Russia since August 30, 2025.
The Flamingo’s development emphasizes pragmatism: it repurposes existing stockpiles, such as Ivchenko AI-25TL turbofan engines sourced from scrapyards and refurbished by replacing titanium parts with cheaper alternatives. This “junkyard” approach reduces costs and accelerates manufacturing, with fuselages produced via carbon-fiber winding machines in just six hours. Plans include localizing engine production under license from Ukrainian firms starting next year.
The Flamingo adopts a straightforward, cost-optimized design resembling historical systems like the V-1 flying bomb or Soviet Tu-141 drones.
Key features include:
Structure: A 12–14 m long fuselage made from radar-transparent composites (fiberglass/carbon fiber) for reduced detectability, with a metal engine nacelle. Fixed straight wings (6 m span) and X-configured control surfaces at the rear.
Propulsion: External Ivchenko AI-25TL turbofan engine (refurbished, with up to 10 hours of life), paired with a solid fuel booster for launch. Cruise speed: 850–900 km/h; maximum: 950 km/h.
Guidance: GPS/GNSS with inertial navigation system (INS) backup and jamming-resistant antennas. Lacks advanced terrain-following systems like TERCOM, relying on satellite and potential optical aids for a circular error probable (CEP) of 14 m.
Flight Profile: Low-altitude cruise at 50 m to evade detection, with a 5,000 m ceiling. Pre-launch preparation: 20–40 minutes.
Mass: 6,000 kg takeoff weight.
This simplicity contrasts with more complex Western designs, enabling faster assembly and scalability.
The Flamingo carries a 1,150 kg (2,540 lb) warhead, often repurposed from Soviet FAB-1000 bombs or equivalents like the Mark 84/BLU-109. Current variants include bunker-busters capable of penetrating 10 m of concrete or soil. Cluster munitions and other types are under development. This payload provides significantly greater destructive power than many peers.
Operational range: 3,000 km (1,900 miles), allowing strikes across European Russia and beyond Novosibirsk from Ukrainian territory. Flight time supports up to 3.5 hours.
Unit cost: $500,000, achieved through repurposed components and simplified production. This is approximately one-fourth to one-fifth the cost of a Tomahawk ($2.1 million including launch canister).
Cost
• FP-5 Flamingo – approximately $500,000 per unit
• Tomahawk Block V – over $2 million per unit
Range
• Flamingo – up to 3,000 km (about 1,900 miles)
• Tomahawk – around 1,500 km (about 930 miles)
Payload
• Flamingo – 1,150 kg (≈ 2,540 lb) warhead
• Tomahawk – approximately 450 kg (≈ 1,000 lb) warhead
Design
• Flamingo – simple, cost-optimized airframe with external engine, fixed wings, and composite fuselage
• Tomahawk – complex, stealth-enhanced design with internal engine and advanced materials
Precision
• Flamingo – circular error probable (CEP) around 14 meters using GNSS and INS guidance
• Tomahawk – CEP under 5 meters with TERCOM, DSMAC, and GPS integration
Survivability
• Flamingo – large (≈ 6,000 kg) and subsonic with limited stealth; depends on mass salvo for effectiveness
• Tomahawk – smaller (≈ 1,500 kg) and more stealthy, optimized for selective precision strikes
Production Scalability
• Flamingo – target output of 200 or more per month as manufacturing ramps up
• Tomahawk – limited production capacity (roughly 40 per year in U.S. budgets)
Summary:
While the Tomahawk offers superior stealth and precision, Ukraine’s FP-5 Flamingo delivers a much larger payload and longer range at a fraction of the cost. Its simplicity and scalability make it a powerful example of “affordable mass,” suited for sustained conflict environments where volume matters as much as accuracy.
The Flamingo enhances Ukraine’s deep-strike capabilities, targeting 90% of Russia’s arms production and critical infrastructure like oil refineries, contributing to economic disruptions. Its deployment signals a potential new arms industry for post-war Ukraine, fostering economic growth.
For global security, the missile highlights the efficacy of low-cost, high-volume weapons in asymmetric warfare. Lessons from Ukraine — where Russia deploys hundreds of missiles and drones monthly — demonstrate the need for “affordable mass” to sustain prolonged engagements. Vulnerabilities, such as susceptibility to defenses, can be mitigated through saturation tactics.
“Given today's endless cyber skirmishes, the West’s edge lies in borrowing Ukraine’s playbook: innovate ruthlessly with cheap, scalable cyber shields to deter China and Russia, turning scarcity into strategic supremacy.”
— Dave Venable, ISRS Board Chair
The U.S. should adopt similar innovative thinking to complement high-end systems like hypersonic weapons.
Key actions include:
Invest in affordable mass production: Accelerate programs like the Air Force’s Family of Affordable Mass Missiles, incorporating junkyard-style repurposing and automation.
Collaborate with allies: Pursue technology transfers from Ukraine to build domestic low-cost cruise missiles.
Rebalance procurement: Shift budgets toward thousands of cheaper munitions for less critical targets, reserving expensive assets for high-value ones.
Enhance resilience: Develop jamming-resistant guidance and scalable manufacturing to counter peer adversaries like China or Russia.
This approach will ensure U.S. forces maintain overmatch in future conflicts through both quantity and quality.
The FP-5 Flamingo marks a pivotal moment in modern weapons development, where cost, creativity, and capacity converge to redefine strategic deterrence. By fusing repurposed materials with scalable engineering, Ukraine has demonstrated that innovation need not be expensive to be transformative. The missile’s long range, heavy payload, and low production cost collectively embody a new model of "affordable mass" that challenges traditional assumptions about precision warfare and industrial capacity. For NATO and allied nations, the lesson is clear: agility and adaptability now rival technology and budgets as the true measures of strength.
Prepared by:
ISRS Strategic Advisory & Risk Analysis Unit
Geneva, Switzerland
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