4 August 2025, Geneva
China has a strategic imperative to prevent Russia from losing the war in Ukraine. A Russian defeat would not only upend the balance of power in Eurasia but also free the United States to fully reorient its military and diplomatic attention toward East Asia and the Indo-Pacific, directly challenging Beijing’s core interests, including Taiwan. As recent analyses from ISW, RAND, CEPA, and CSIS reveal, China’s actions are not neutral; they are calibrated to prolong the conflict, sustain Russia’s warfighting capability, and distract the West.
This would fundamentally disrupt the emerging multipolar order that Beijing champions, critically enabling the United States to decisively pivot its strategic resources and focus towards East Asia and the Indo-Pacific, intensifying existing challenges to China's core interests, especially regarding Taiwan and maritime claims.
A Multipolar Vision at Risk
China relies on Russia to anchor a multipolar global order. A total defeat would bolster U.S.-led coalitions and reaffirm the liberal international system Beijing seeks to counterbalance. Both nations are united in their ambition for a 'multipolar' world order to counter perceived U.S. hegemony, viewing Russia as an indispensable partner in this vision. A Russian defeat would significantly empower the U.S.-led liberal international system, undermining Beijing's long-term geopolitical objectives.
Geopolitical Buffer and Shared Revisionism
Russia acts as a Eurasian buffer and co-author of an alternative geopolitical vision. China relies on Russia to co-lead the push for a truly multipolar global order, viewing its strategic alignment with Moscow as essential to counterbalancing a U.S.-led liberal international system that Beijing perceives as hegemonic. A Russian defeat would significantly undermine this shared anti-hegemonic ambition and consolidate Western influence.
East Asia in the Crosshairs
Chinese officials have privately warned EU counterparts that a Russian defeat would enable the U.S. to pivot fully to Asia, intensifying challenges to China's core interests, particularly concerning Taiwan and maritime disputes. Beijing views the continued conflict as a critical diversion for the West.
Narrative Engineering in the Global South
Beijing employs sophisticated cognitive strategies, actively amplifying narratives that frame the Ukraine war as a Western proxy conflict and normalizing its crucial support for Russia as non-lethal or commercial, despite clear dual-use implications, to bolster its revisionist ally without direct confrontation. This erodes sanction cohesion and legitimizes aggression.
Normalization of Strategic Enablement
By positioning its support as non-lethal or commercial, China is normalizing a playbook for aiding revisionist allies without direct confrontation, reshaping the threshold for accountability. This playbook is sometimes referred to as a "whole of government" approach, where China is weaponizing any and all strategic defeat approaches.
ISW and RAND assessments confirm that Chinese-sourced components, including drone engines, semiconductors, and precision tools, are integral to Russia’s defense production. ISRS also released a flashpoint briefing on this. Evidence of China's strategic enablement includes the provision of extensive dual-use components (e.g., microelectronics, machine tools, optics) critical to Russia's military-industrial complex, despite Beijing's denials of lethal aid.
China has increased energy imports, expanded use of the CIPS financial system, and offered currency swap backstops to cushion Russian sanctions. Economic stabilization for Russia is achieved through vastly increased energy imports at discounted prices and the expansion of yuan-denominated trade and alternative financial channels, significantly mitigating Western sanctions.
Beijing routinely uses diplomatic channels and state media to deflect blame onto NATO and the U.S., obscuring Russian culpability and calling for "neutral" peace solutions that favor Russian interests. Diplomatic shielding includes consistent abstentions or votes against condemning Russia at the UN and the propagation of shared anti-Western narratives in multilateral forums.
What it means: Loss of Crimea or major territorial rollback; regime destabilization or internal fractures.
Implications for China:
Increased instability in Central Asia and along China’s northern frontier.
Collapse of a key strategic partner and global narrative ally.
The U.S. and NATO are free to concentrate their forces and diplomatic capital on East Asia and Taiwan.
Emboldens Western deterrence efforts and revalidates liberal norms.
Further reading: China Doesn’t Want Russia to Win—Just to Bleed, Obey, and Keep US Distracted
What it means: Ongoing low-intensity conflict or frozen lines with periodic escalations; neither side wins decisively.
Implications for China:
Sustains Western distraction and resource drain.
Allows China to continue supplying dual-use goods without overt escalation.
Maintains Russia as a weakened but functional buffer and junior partner.
Preserves ambiguity; China can posture as a "peace broker" while ensuring strategic benefit.
Further reading: China's foreign minister tells EU that Beijing cannot afford Russia to lose in Ukraine, media reports
What it means: Russia makes slow but grinding advances in the east or south, solidifies control, and pushes for political concessions.
Implications for China:
Reinforces China's view that autocracies can outlast democracies in attritional conflict.
Further fractures NATO unity over escalation vs. negotiation.
Provides China with real-time lessons on sanctions evasion and adaptive warfare.
Reduces deterrent effect for future Taiwan scenarios.
Further reading: China Is Studying Russia’s Sanctions Evasion to Prepare for Taiwan Conflict
What it means: Ukraine cedes territory under pressure; the West pushes for a ceasefire; Russia consolidates land bridge.
Implications for China:
Validates revisionist aggression if followed by normalization.
Weakens confidence in U.S. security guarantees globally.
Encourages Chinese assertiveness in contested territories (e.g., South China Sea, Taiwan ADIZ).
Further reading: China's foreign minister tells EU that Beijing cannot afford Russia to lose in Ukraine, media reports
What it means: Western long-range systems enable territorial reclamation; risk of direct NATO-Russia confrontation rises.
Implications for China:
Increased risk of conflict spillover or forced alignment choices.
Pushes Beijing to consider overt support to Russia or deeper non-alignment hedging.
Reinforces China's belief that it must accelerate military self-reliance.
Further reading: Beijing cannot allow Russia to lose Ukraine war because it wants America distracted, top Chinese diplomat told EU: report
Sanctions enforcement must focus on intermediary networks in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa funneling Chinese tech to Russia.
Narrative campaigns must counter China's framing in the Global South.
NATO must scale European deterrence to allow U.S. rebalancing toward the Pacific without creating a strategic vacuum.
Dual-theater strategic planning (Europe + Indo-Pacific) must become the default, not the exception.
Track and expose CCP enabler networks, especially those masquerading as commercial exporters.
Support cognitive security in Global South nations vulnerable to Chinese and Russian narratives.
Map hybrid supply chains sustaining Russia’s war effort.
Prepare for escalation scenarios where China increases military and intelligence cooperation with Russia.
Beijing doesn't just prefer a Russian survival; it needs it. Whether to keep U.S. focus divided, to learn from the battlefield, or to strengthen autocratic solidarity, China’s strategic calculus depends on preventing Moscow’s collapse. The West must treat this alignment as more than tacit. It is deliberate, calculated, and accelerating.
Prepared by:
ISRS Strategic Advisory & Risk Analysis Unit
Geneva, Switzerland
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